A report published on Saturday 4th July raised serious concerns about pupils developing stress-related conditions linked to taking high-stakes tests. It was reported that “The National Union of Teachers’ report says … most teachers surveyed for the report agreed pupils became “very stressed/anxious in the time leading up to Sats/public examinations”.”
Obviously, reports of mental illness and stress amongst pupils are very concerning and need to be taken seriously.
There are two things here – the nature of the school accountability system and the nature of the tests that school children take. I have talked about school accountability before on this blog, and there is very good evidence that when Wales abolished school league tables, pupil attainment fell dramatically. That is not the topic here.
The tests that pupils take in England at age 16 are very high-stakes. Does this have to be the case? Are there alternatives? Why do we make kids sit these high-stakes high-pressure exams at 16?
I think that there are two main alternatives: use teacher assessments, or just have no exams and no marks and each pupil simply leaves with a certificate confirming that they have completed a certain number of years of schooling.
What about teacher assessments? They would be based on a full year’s work and would be capable of giving a rounded view of each child’s capabilities. There are, however, three big objections.
The first objection is simply pragmatic: workload. At a time when teachers responded in such force to the Secretary of State’s enquiry about workload and over-stretch, adding another substantial and complex item would be impossible. It’s true of course that teachers provide assessments for their pupils now, but this would have to be a very different thing if it summed up a child’s time in school and was the only thing they left with.
Second, imagine the pressure that teachers would come under. Their personal assessment of your child’s maths ability might make all the difference to her getting into Cambridge – you’re not going to talk to the teacher? It would make the key parent-teacher relationship very fraught. And we can hardly ban parents from talking to teachers.
Third, there are two sources of bias in teacher assessments, both very clear in the data. There is centrality bias: teacher assessments of children’s performances are much more tightly clustered around the middle than are remotely-marked tests. For example, looking at Keystage 2 tests, the variance in test scores is around 20% higher than the variance in teacher assessments in English and maths. This happens in all jobs where people are evaluated, but particularly in ones where there is an on-going personal relationship. Second, there are gender, ethnic and social biases that seem to arise from stereo-typing, which we evidenced here and discussed more recently here. These arise simply because teachers – like everyone else – unconsciously use stereotypes to form judgements. There is evidence for this in England’s schools from us here and from IOE here. There has to be a way for children to shine, regardless of what their teacher might think of them.
If using teacher assessments is out, what about just having a leaving certificate, no exams, no marks?
The reality is that in life beyond school, people will still need to be able to differentiate between candidates with different abilities. And to differentiate both types of ability – languages, maths, art, sports – as well as levels of ability. If all pupils left school with the same certificate, perhaps just differentiated by completed years of schooling, then firms and universities and other organisations would have to do the differentiating themselves. They would all have to run their own tests (or subcontract them).
This would be much worse than the present situation. There would potentially be very many tests. Perhaps with every job interview and every university application everyone would have to take tests in English, maths, language, science, … And the job would hang directly on the test, rather than slightly indirectly now. This would be much less efficient, much less fair and much less meritocratic.
Less meritocratic because there would be considerable scope for favouritism in each organisation.
Less fair because, removed from the impartial bureaucracy of the school exam system, there would be greater scope for extra help, cheating and non-neutral marking.
Less efficient because having (essentially) the same exams for everyone at the same time, marked at the same time and to the same standard is an incredibly efficient way of distinguishing different levels of ability. Without these, the testing and differentiating of abilities would be fragmented, cumbersome and very variable.
These local, amateur, idiosyncratic tests would reduce productivity by reducing economic (allocative) efficiency: the wrong people would be in the wrong jobs and courses, and would spend a lot of time working their way back to the right ones.
And finally, if everyone’s school days did culminate in just an ungraded leaving certificate, it is hard to believe that there would be as much motivation for pupils to try hard at school. The love of learning cannot take you all the way and if you get the same certificate for working on your homework as you get for watching TV, then it’s likely that less learning will get done.
This is obviously not at all to say that our current exam system is perfect; far from it. But one can imagine, if we were in that highly inefficient world of very many independent bespoke tests, that it would evolve to something like we have now.
Compared with the alternatives, our system of high-stakes exams is more meritocratic and more efficient and, in the end, probably less stressful than any alternatives. This is of course not to say that there might be valuable ways of making the experience less stressful.
Recent debates about inequality have been dominated by discussion of pay at the very top of the income distribution. Whilst this is undoubtedly important, we surely also need to be concerned about the earnings gap between the middle and the bottom, and between the bottom and the very bottom.
This is where education comes in. How can school reform reduce earnings inequality? For all that special factors do matter, earnings are hugely affected by qualifications, and so the chances for pupils to get good qualifications matter for earnings inequality. The earnings penalty for not getting at least 5 good grades at GCSE is estimated to be over 25%.
There are obviously a lot of facets to this, many of which have been discussed previously in this blog.
A key issue is your chance of getting into a high-performing school, bringing school admissions to centre stage. A report last week from the BBC’s Sean Coughlan discusses an innovative admissions policy from a new academy in Birmingham.
Innovation is surely needed.
At the moment we decide the question of who gets into high-performing schools by working out who lives nearest. Unsurprisingly, the housing market reflects this advantage in substantial premia for houses close enough to guarantee entry to the most popular schools. And as reported here, estate agents are providing ever more, and more localised, information on nearby schools.
We showed here (scientific paper) and here (blog) that this schools’ admission policy has a major effect on pupils’ chances of getting into a top school. We showed that the gap in average school quality between the richest and poorest fifth of families increases by over 30% when factoring in the probability of admission based on proximity to the school.
If we want to do something to reduce inequality and to raise social mobility, one place to start is to even up the chances of attending the best schools.
Maybe we should just abandon the proximity criterion altogether? There are pros and cons to the idea of having tight local catchment areas around schools. The major con is as just mentioned, it has a very regressive impact. The pros are that it can generate a sense of neighbourhood – kids can play together, study together and form friendships. The Mayor of Boston explains clearly the downside of having more fragmented school catchment areas: “Pick any street. A dozen children probably attend a dozen different schools. Parents might not know each other; children might not play together. They can’t carpool, or study for the same tests.”
So it’s not an easy problem.
The school in Birmingham, University of Birmingham School, has a very interesting solution to this problem: “It is basing its admissions for 11-year-olds on how close families live to four “nodes” across the city. After siblings and looked-after children, half the intake will be based on closeness to the school, with the other half of pupils shared between closeness to the other three points on the map.” The idea is explicitly to try to secure a diverse intake to the school, “mixed in terms of socio-economics, ethnicity and academic ability.”
Mossbourne has a different approach to the same aim, combining ability banding and geographical rings round the school. Whilst living very close to the school helps, the school reserves places for those living further away.
In essence, both of these solutions are like this: reserve a fraction of places for ‘local’ children; the remainder of school places are open to anyone and if those are over-subscribed, use something other than distance as a tie-breaker, such as random draw.
The policy question is: what is the optimal fraction to reserve for those living further away? 25%? 50%? Research to be done, but its surely not 0%.
One way to make progress is to study what happens in practice when schools innovate.
By: Simon Burgess
Schools are given two highly valuable resources: the potential of the nation’s children and a lot of public money. While £40bn sounds like a lot of money, it pales into insignificance compared to the value of improving human capital.
Schools should be accountable for how they deal with these: to parents for their kids’ progress and to the taxpayer via central government for their use of public money. In England, the accountability system has two components: performance information in the league tables and Ofsted reports. This accountability matters. We have shown that the publication of school league tables improves school performance, and have shown that the detail also matters. (It may just be election fever but there seems to be a danger of ad hoc extras being tacked on to this framework: the Tories for example “… will expect every pupil by the age of 11 to know their times tables off by heart, to perform long division and complex multiplication and to be able to read a novel. They should be able to write a short story with accurate punctuation, spelling and grammar.” This does not seem helpful).
The important policy issue now is about beefing up the link between the information provided by the accountability system and action to turn low-performing schools around. There are plenty of examples of individual schools experiencing a dramatic turnaround – see this example just this week. But the policy goal is to make this systematic rather than serendipitous. This is part of the rationale for a ‘middle layer’ of oversight in the education hierarchy, between schools and the Department of Education.
Why is this needed? We currently have two main channels for action.
The first is bottom-up, from parents choosing schools. Parents scrutinise the school league tables and decide which schools to apply to; low-performing schools get fewer applicants and so come under pressure to raise their game. This is the school choice channel for school turnaround. It works to a degree, but is not very strong (for reasons on another day) or very quick. The substantial attainment gap that opened up between England and Wales after the latter abolished school tables was due in part to that mechanism. We speculate that it was also due in part to schools’ reactions to the ‘shame’ felt by the low-performing schools in England that Welsh schools could hide from.
The second channel is a recent market-contestability measure: the potential setting up of a free school in response to low performance was meant to keep all schools on their toes. The evidence suggests there is little competitive spill-over pressure and it is not credible as a source of ongoing pressure.
There is a third potential channel that is resisted: Ofsted is resolutely determined not to do school intervention, but to stick to inspecting and reporting.
The ‘Middle Tier’
So the ‘middle layer’ is to make a stronger link from information to action. It is also proposed because of the craziness of having central government be directly responsible for over half the secondary schools in the country.
What should this be like? One option is for it to be left to academy chains to fulfil this role. While these groups are growing significantly, they nevertheless account for around half of academies and obviously no non-academies. Their regulation is an important issue for the next parliament.
So a comprehensive statutory body is better. The Coalition set up Regional Schools Commissioners to fulfil this role for academies. Their role is precisely to intervene to deal with poor performance, but is limited to academies and free schools: “Regional schools commissioners are responsible for … intervening in underperforming academies and free schools in their area.” They are required to monitor academy performance and take action when required. The Commissioners are supported by a small number of experienced local academy headteachers.
RSCs versus DSSs
The alternative is the proposal from Labour for Directors of School Standards (DSS). There are similarities but also a number of important differences. Similarities: the number one remit of a DSS is school turnaround: “facilitate intervention to drive up performance – including in coasting and ‘fragile’ schools”. The mechanisms for turnaround are pretty similar, though emphases and language differs. The DSS document emphasises a requirement to engage in “collaboration”. It’s possible that this may become something closer to academisation of a school including acquiring a sponsor in extreme circumstances. The Tories propose to dramatically increase the number of schools at risk of forced academisation.
The first and most important difference is that a DSS will cover all schools in her/his area. This will be achieved by essentially turning all schools into academies. This seems much more sensible, coherent and efficient to take all schools under a single umbrella. A second difference is that there will be many more DSSs than RSCs: there are 8 RSCs and suggestions of perhaps ten times that many DSSs. This is also an improvement – if taken seriously, this is a big job.
I think that the DSS proposal is very positive. The risk is that two factors will overwhelm the post-holders. First, they are responsible for more or less everything to do with schools: attainment obviously; but also financial probity (very specialist skills needed), and then also “British values”; obesity; personal, social and health education; and so on. Arguably, they should be asked to focus solely on attainment and school turnaround. Second, they are to have very little support. The DSS will have “a small back-up secretariat providing only the most essential administrative support”. Unless the DSS is just meant to sit in an office and issue edicts, this won’t work; more support will be needed.
By: Sarah Smith
*The following blog by Sarah Smith is related to her recent publication – Competitive helping in online giving*
In next Sunday’s London marathon, the elite runners will battle it out for the men’s and women’s titles but another competition of sorts will already have taken place on charity runners’ fundraising pages. Each year, millions of pounds are raised in sponsorship donations, most through online fundraising pages which make it easier for fundraisers to raise money – and for charities to claim Gift Aid. But the fundraising pages also create a public platform for giving, with implications for how donors behave.
It will surprise few to learn that donors look to amounts given by other people in deciding how much to give. A large donation (£100+), particularly one made early on, can have a sizeable effect, increasing subsequent amounts given by an average of £10. More surprising, is that at least part of the effect of large donations is to elicit a competitive response by males in the presence of attractive female fundraisers. In biological terms, male donors appear to engage in “competitive helping”.
In a paper out today, we report the findings of a study of competitive helping based on fundraising pages from the 2014 London Marathon. We looked at the responses to large donations and compared how the responses varied by donor gender and fundraiser gender/attractiveness (do male donors increase their giving more in response to a large donation when there is an attractive female fundraiser?) and the gender of the person making the large donation (do male donors increase their giving more when the person making a large donation was another male?). Attractiveness was scored on the basis of external assessments of the fundraisers profile photos and attractive was defined as the top 25% of scores.
The results are striking. We confirm that large donations elicit a positive response among subsequent donors in terms of how much they give. But the increase in giving triggered by a large donation is FOUR TIMES GREATER among male donors responding to a large donation given by another male donor in the presence of an attractive female fundraiser. It is hard to think of another explanation for this, other than a biological mechanism – male donors compete, albeit possibly subconsciously, with other male donors for the attention of attractive females. By contrast, there is no such response among female donors.
What are the implications for fundraisers? Getting generous friends to donate early will help to raise more money. It is also important to choose a good profile picture – and one in which you are smiling. Not everyone can be among the most attractive fundraisers, but our results also show that a picture in which the fundraiser is smiling can be just as effective, boosting donations by more than 10%.
By: Simon Burgess
Over half of all secondary schools now have Academy status, and the number will continue to grow rapidly in the next parliament. The case for academy schools is largely the case for school autonomy, and there is robust evidence from US Charter schools that autonomy can be helpful in raising pupil attainment. While the constraints on schools might have been overstated after Local Management of Schools, there is really no going back, and schools will almost certainly retain most or all of their ‘freedoms’.
But there are some important issues about the governance and autonomy of academies at a different level. These have been hardly discussed at all and, given the sheer number of academies, may well become one of the most serious issues for the next Secretary of State to deal with.
Academy chains are now a big part of the education scene, reportedly covering about half of all academies. They have also come to bear the burden of quite a lot of policy hopes for school turnaround. But policy-makers need to think more about the governance by and of chains.
There is also a paradox here – if academies were born from a desire for autonomy, how much autonomy do the schools have within a chain? And if the most effective chains are the ones keeping the tightest grip on their schools, did we get wrong the level at which to increase autonomy? Should it perhaps be groups of schools that have autonomy (chains and of course, ironically, local authorities), rather than individual schools? While leading commentators champion autonomy, this is usually meant as autonomy from government rather than autonomy from Chain HQ.
There are three main issues: the formation of school chains or groups, the activity and performance of groups, and the setting up of new schools.
Formation of school groups
One of the most important things we want policy to achieve with school chains is to mimic the operation of a market, in the following sense: we want highly successful schools and leaders to provide education for more pupils and unsuccessful ones for fewer. The formation of school groups can help a lot to achieve this. We want existing high performing schools to form a group with (in slightly less polite language, take over) a nearby low-performing school. Or an existing chain of high-performing schools to do that.
There seems to be little point in encouraging just random assemblages of schools to join together beyond pooling back-office functions and bulk-buying stuff. More clearly, we would surely want to rule out a group of all local low-performing schools banding together. Why? Two reasons – first it removes effective choice from parents if all local schools are of the same ‘brand’. Secondly, by removing choice it also removes the pressure to improve. While all this seems ‘top-down’ in fact the idea is simply to mimic a well-functioning market in which the successful performers grow and either take-over or out-compete low-performers.
As the number of school take-overs and chains and ‘brands’ increases, there will be issues of market power to think about. This is a major issue in hospitals, but they are an order of magnitude bigger so not a major worry yet.
What do school groups do?
There is a tendency (until very recently, basically a blind hope) to see all chains as good things – highly effective or at worst, benign. Recent research, however, including from the path-breaking Chris Cook, suggests that perhaps just a couple of chains are transformative (ARK and Harris), and the others are pretty average; one chain, AET, has been strongly criticised by OFSTED. (You can now see for yourself the stats on the secondary school chains, having first read the health warnings about the data).
The widespread current view is that what school groups do is aid collaboration. Who could be against collaboration? Two points to make. First it is not clear that collaboration in the everyday sense is what effective school chains do. Some do no doubt. But in some cases it is more that the over-taking chain does some possibly rather un-collaborative turning around of the taken-over school. This is surely what policy makers and local parents want. That may not always work, but I think it is a mistake to see chains as synonymous with collaboration.
Second, the London Challenge is seen as the epitome of school collaboration, and the London effect is cited as evidence that this works. I have written about that here, here and here, so no more now; just to say that while the London Challenge may have done many wonderful things for London schools, there is little evidence that it has impacted dramatically on pupil attainment.
In summary, collaboration may not be what the few effective chains do, and there is little evidence that collaboration works to raise attainment.
Setting up new schools
The organisations in prime place to set up new schools should be existing high performing schools, or existing groups that have shown that they can deliver a high quality education. Whilst there should definitely be an open and transparent competition to set up new capacity, we could use a deliberately loaded question: is there any reason why this group should not provide a new school?
What about Free Schools? These are essentially academies but set up following proposals from groups other than the LAs. In principle the idea is to make the education market ‘contestable’ and to provide the competitive pressure to keep schools on their toes and performing well. However, the evidence does not suggest that this is having much impact.
The big issue associated with free schools is this: there is only limited capital to spend on setting up new schools. So there is a strategic choice to be made between provision of extra capacity in a place where schools are ineffective but places are plentiful, and neighbourhoods where there are insufficient places. And of course, where schools are ineffective, places are almost bound to be plentiful.
Two conclusions: contrary to Cameron’s announcement of an expanding free school programme, we should abandon the current policy of building free schools in the hope that they will raise standards all around. However, where new school places are needed, we should retain the principle that outsiders are able to propose to set up a new school as part of an open competition, but with a strong presumption in favour of existing high performing schools or chains.
By: Simon Burgess
Does money matter for schools? Money matters for the provision of most things. And in one sense, obviously it does – people’s jobs are at risk with budget cuts, promotions are postponed and tight budgets just make life a lot harder for Headteachers and Governors.
And yet whether money matters for pupil attainment is much less clear. In fact, while there is evidence on both sides, possibly the majority of researchers in this field would agree that increases in a school’s resources are unlikely to have a major effect on attainment. This is in large part the debate about the number of teachers a school has relative to its pupils (class size) but it is also broader than that.
It’s not that we haven’t seen big increases in spending. Over the last ten years of the Labour government, 2000 – 2010, real per pupil spending rose by 68%. While GCSE scores have risen over that period, we have not seen anything like a commensurate rise in attainment. (Quite why money doesn’t appear to help much is a really interesting question, but not one for today). More broadly, one of the findings from the international comparison of attainment in PISA is that money does not buy success; one of the ‘seven big [education] myths’ set out by PISA is “it’s all about money”.
Nevertheless, the parties’ proposals for the education budget over the next parliament are interesting. Both Conservatives and Labour have made slightly differing pledges on ‘protecting’ the school budget. These have been decoded and quantified by Sam Freedman, one-man fact and analysis centre, now Research Director of TeachFirst. Labour promises a real terms protection of the entire 3-19 budget, but not a per-pupil protection, while the Conservatives promise a cash per-pupil protection of the schools budget. His best estimates are that under a Conservative government the implied cut for schools is about 10.5% and under a Labour administration a cut of about 9% because of steeply rising pupil numbers.
On top of inflation and rising pupil numbers, schools face higher costs from higher pension and national insurance payments, so budgets are definitely going to be squeezed.
What would be the likely consequences of any substantial budget cuts for schools? How would schools respond? The scientifically correct answer is “who knows”. Our analysis of schools’ financial decisions in the happier times of budget increases showed that there was zero consensus of action among schools on how to spend it.
This graph shows the distribution of schools’ spending by category depending on how much their income rose or fell between 2008/9 and 2009/10. The box plot shows that for each group of schools and in each expenditure category some schools made big increases and some made big cuts. For any group of organisations there will be differences in emphasis, but this shows wildly different decisions being made in similar circumstances. Fewer than half of schools made an increase in spending on teachers their largest change.
Of course, down is not the same as up, and some cuts could be severe; but it is very difficult to predict how schools will react to budget cuts, and even harder to predict the impact on pupil attainment.
The Pupil Premium
The big innovation in schools’ budgets over this parliament has been the Pupil Premium (PP) championed by the Liberal Democrats. It is paid to the school for each disadvantaged pupil in the school. While it is definitely an innovation, it is also important to recognise that the per-pupil funding for schools with many disadvantaged children was substantially higher than other schools under the previous government; see this for example. The PP started at £430 per pupil, increasing to £1300 for primary school pupils and £935 for secondary school pupils in 2014/15.
The PP has been set up very well, in all but possibly one aspect. It is directly attached to an individual pupil which does make it different to what came before. Schools can plan financially on the basis of their current stock of PP-eligible pupils, and the admission of new intakes has clear financial implications. The funding was guaranteed for a number of years and was easily predictable. Also, the fact that the rate per child started relatively low and then increased substantially was a smart move as schools were not faced with an immediate supply of resource that they did not know how to spend.
The negative aspect is the restrictions placed on how schools could spend the money. It’s clear why the restriction was made that the funds have to be spent solely on the eligible pupils and not just absorbed into the general school budget. But it rules out possibly the most important thing that a school could use the money for – to pay a bit more to hire a more effective maths or English teacher. One priority is to find a way to maintain the monitoring of the PP spend whilst opening up these possibilities.
Will the PP be continued into the next Parliament? Both Labour and Conservatives have pledged to ‘protect’ the school budget, and while that obviously does not imply a line-by-line protection, it would seem hard to square these pledges with the scrapping of the PP. While money as a whole does not seem to matter as much in this context as others, losing a substantial additional sum focussed specifically on disadvantaged pupils would feel like a step backwards.
By: Simon Burgess
There is a paradox here. The key research finding is that teacher effectiveness is hugely important for pupil attainment – much more so than class size, IT in the classroom, or any of the other policies that politicians typically reach for. Perhaps unusually, this evidence has made its way into the policy debate fairly quickly and is now widely accepted. Teacher effectiveness is about pupil attainment: a highly effective teacher is one whose pupils make strong academic progress. Teachers do many things for their pupils but policy should surely be focussed first on attainment. In this country, our work
showed that putting effective teachers in front of a pupil instead of ineffective teachers for all subjects just for the two GCSE years wipes out half of the GCSE points gap between kids from disadvantaged families and the rest. So the prize for a great policy is huge.
You might think that this would mean that teachers are at the centre of the policy debate, with the parties and think tanks producing detailed discussion of the best policies to raise teacher effectiveness. With two main exceptions discussed below, there has been little new policy making about teacher effectiveness.
In fact, this relative neglect is probably justified. It is proving hard for researchers to progress from that initial, crucial, finding about teacher effectiveness. We researchers have not yet solved the questions of how to improve teacher effectiveness. It should be said that this is not through want of trying: this is a major focus of research effort here and in the US. The research agenda lying before myself and other researchers in this field includes: what do effective teachers do? Can this be learned? Or is it about selection? Can we measure effective teaching? What should the teacher “professional journey” be, and what contract forms support that? The difficulties are in obtaining robustly causal estimates, and of running large scale random control trials in schools. Hopefully we will have some of that evidence in time to inform policy soon.
The two areas of policy affecting teachers are the demand for only qualified teachers in schools; and the devolved introduction of performance pay for teachers.
Unqualified teachers? or continuously re-qualified teachers?
The Conservatives have allowed unqualified teachers, and UKIP support this. Labour say that they would require that all teachers hold or are working towards Qualified Teacher Status (QTS). To me, it seems unlikely that this is a first order issue for pupil attainment. While there is no specific evidence relating robust estimates of effectiveness with QTS status, in general the bulk of the international evidence shows that there is little relationship between the individual’s own academic career and her/his effectiveness as a teacher; nor any consistent gaps in effectiveness by route of entry into teaching.
So in itself it is probably not a big deal. However, it may be a politically astute way of bringing in, as a package, another item in the Labour manifesto. This is the pledge to require teachers to “keep their skills and knowledge up to date” throughout their careers “as a condition of remaining in the classroom”. This is potentially a very important proposal, albeit trailed previously, and if pursued vigorously could make a significant difference to average teacher effectiveness. The key questions will be about implementation, and while there is scope for this to be game-changing, there is also scope for it to simply provide more paperwork for no real gain.
Performance pay for teachers
Since September 2014 all state-funded schools in England, academies and non-academies, are required to have a performance pay system for teachers. Not “allowed to”, but “required to”. The international evidence on the likely effects of this is genuinely mixed. Those on both sides of the argument can point to high quality studies by leading researchers that find substantial positive effects, or no effects.
But in a sense the potentially more impactful element of the policy is that schools are left to determine the nature of the scheme themselves. Designing performance pay schemes is complex with many factors to decide, and many opportunities to make crazy choices. In fact some, maybe many, schools have adopted policy templates produced by others – their LAs, headteacher unions, and so on. But still, the scope for some disastrous outcomes is not negligible.
The two common findings are: firstly, incentives work, sometimes powerfully; but secondly that that powerful effect can be mis-directed if the scheme is badly designed. Having 30,000 schools write their own performance pay schemes is certainly in line with a less prescriptive, more autonomous schools system; it is also playing with fire.